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3LONG-RUN TRENDS IN STRIKE ACTIVITY
IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE*
Outbursts of strike activity in many industrial societies during
the late 1960s and early 1970s focused great attention on the
state of labor-capital relations in advanced capitalist systems
and led to many Inquiries into the sources of the "new" labor
militancy. The events of May-June 1968 In France, the "hot
autumn" of 1969 In Italy, and the nation-wide strikes of the coal
miners in 1972 and 1974 in the United Kingdom (the first since
the great general strike of 1926) are the most dramatic examples,
but sharp upturns in strike activity in Canada (1969,1972),
Finland (1971), the United States (J970) and smaller strike waves
in other nations also contributed to the surge of interest in
labo- discontent.
Recent attempts to reevaluate the potential of advanced
industrial soclelties to generate severe social conflicts are
perhaps a useful corrective to the dominant theoretical
perspective of postwar social science which stressed the
"Integration" of the working class into the socioeconomic fabric
of modern capitalist nations. Sociologists wrote of the
Am QAigai of blue-collar workers; oolitical scientists and
political sociologists argued about, but in the main, I think,
* rhis is one of a series of papers from my prol-ect on
industrial conflict in advanced Industrial societies supported by
the National Science Foundation. I am grateful to Nicholas
Vasilatos and Marilyn Shapleigh for able research assistance on
all phases of the pro)ect.
4subsc-lbed to the idea of "the end of ideology"; and, among
industrial relations specialists, the thesis of the "withering
away of the strike" (most prominently associated with the
important, comparative study of Ross and Hartman) was widely
acceoted. (1)
One of the aims of this monograph is to show that when industrial
conflict is analyzed over the long-run -- i.e. Is viewed in
historical perspective -- the thesis of a 2ea-L withering away
of the strike is at odos with the empircal evidence, and that the
emphasis on a agg labor militancy is to a great extent misplaced.
The first part of the monograph introduces a three-dimensional
characterization of strike activity and analyzes trends in the
overall magnitude of Industrial conflict in
the turn of the century.
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(1) Ross and Hartman, 1960.
(2) Economic variables do, of course, have an important influence
on short-run fluctuations in strike activity. See Hibbs, 1976
and the studies cited therein.
5are largely explained by the effectiveness of social democratic
and labor parties in shifting the locus of the distribution of
national income away from the private sector (the economic
marketplace) to the public sector (the political marketplace).
The final section of the monograph reviews recent economic and
political developments in the highly developed welfare states of
Scandinavia, and speculates about the implications of trends in
the public sector share of national Income for political and
industrial conflict over distributional issues.
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7In the course of their Investigation, Ross and Hartman
constructed a half dozen or more st'ike indicators; but in
developing the "withering away of the strike" argument they
relIed heavilIy on the analysis of only two measures: man-days
lost in strike activity per union member ("Membership Loss
Ratio") and man-days lost in strike activity per worker involved
(average "Ouration"). As I have asgued elsewhef-e (1) the
Membership Loss Ratio is a poor index on which to base general
inferences about secular strike trends. This is partially
because union membership data are very unreliable for some
countries, but also because the meaning of unionization differs
greatly across nations. (2) International comparison of union
membershio rations are therefore problematic. Average strike
duratior is a perfectly sensible indicator of an important
dimension of strike 3ctivity, which indeed exhibits a long-run
decline in many industrial societies. 4owever, this measure is
much too narrow in scope to support sweeping conclusions about
trends in the overall magnitude of labor militancy. (3)
(1) Hibbs, 1976.
(2) Contrast, for example, the conception of union membership in
Canada and the United States -- where *members* include all
workers covered by contract who merely oay dues, typically via an
automatic check-off (payroll deduction) method -- with union
membership in the largest unions in France and Italy -- where
*members* are usually militant activists. (Although in recent
years the French CGT and the Italian CGIL have tried to become
mass organizations.) The strength of F-ench and Italian unions
are probably judged oetter by the number of workers that they can
mobilize for an activity rather than 3y the number of their
official members.
(3) For example, in many nations decliing strike duration is
accompanied by rising strike frequency. I think that this tells
8Therefore, perhaps the withering away thesis represents an
optical IlIusion that stems from placing too heavy an emphasis on
faulty and/or limited indicators.
This cannot be the whole story, however, for in the introduction
to hiao1ia Pallana 21 Dnairia. =gaiigt, Ross and Hartman
claimed that even gross man-days lost in strike activity had
everywhere declined:
"There has been a pronounced decline in strike activity
throughout the world. Man-days of idleness in the late 1950's
are fewer than in the late 1940*s or the late 1930's, despite the
Increases in populatior and union membe-shio." ()
Apparently Ross and Hartman, along with many others, took the
momentary, cyclical iownturn in strike activity experienced by
many countries in the 1950's -- for example, Canada, France,
Italy, United Kingdom end the United States -- to be an enduring
featire of postwar labor relations in capitalist industrial
systems. When viewed in relation to the strike explosions which
occured in most nations toward the end 3r just after the second
World War, the short-lived labor quiescence of the middle and
late 1950s undoubtedly gave the impression that a withering away
of the strike was at hand.
In reviewing the Ross and Hartman thesis I have referred at a
number of points to observable trends and fluctuations in
us more about rational labor adaptation to a changing environment
than it does about trends in labor aggressiveness or labor
militancy. A subsequent monograph will treat this issue
extensively.
(J) Ross and Hartman, J960, pp. 4-5.
'3
twentieth century strike activity. Before looking at the
emprical data in detali, however, it is necessary to present an
explicit scheme for strike measurement. The International Labor
Office compiles and oublishes data on three basic components of
industrial conflict that are supplied by the national labor
ministriest the number of strikes, the number of workers
involved (strikers)and the number of man-days lost in strike
activity. Annual data on these components are reoorted for
economy-wide totals and for nine separate sectors of economic
activity. Since this monograph is concerned with national,
economy-wide trends, only the aggregate data are used in the
analyses reported here.
Following the earlier, seminal work of Forchelmer, Knowles, and
Goetz-Girey and the more recent work of Shorter and Tilly, (1)
the basic industrial conflict variables are used in conjunction
with data on nonagricultural civilian wage and salary employment
(2) to form three theoretically distinct dimensions of strike
(1) Forcheimer, 1948; Knowles, 1952; Goetz-Girey, 1963; and
Shorter and Tilly, 1971.
(2) Since strikes rarely occur In the agricultural sector (and
those that do are not recorded with great accuracy), I have
excluded agricultural workers from the labor force data of all
nations except Italy, a country in which there has been
substantial strike activity by farm laborers during most of the
twentieth century. The military as well as small proprietors,
entrepreneurs, cEgn1t.Jr_, and other self-employed persons have
also been excluded from the labor force data because they
cont-ibute little to aggregate strike activity but comprise a
significant fraction of the work force in many nations 'and time
periods. International and intertemporal comparisons of
industrial conflict are therefore facilitated by using the number
of nonagricultural civilian wage and salary workers to adjust the
strike statistics for differences in labor force size.
10
activityi the average .11" of strikes, i.e. the number of
workers involved per strike; the average dyC.Ation of strikes,
i.e. man-days lost per worker involved; and a size-adjusted
measure of strike IC auenCX, i.e. the njmber of strikes per 1000
nonagricultural civilian wage and salary workers.
5igL workers involved (strikers)/strikes
Qyctia±.IQQ man-days lost/strikers (1)
ECit.2aaY. strikes/civilian wage and salary workers
Each of these dimensions (defined per unit of time)
for time-series and cross-national analysis. It is
in 1000s.
is suitable
advantageous,
however, to array them into a three-dimensional solid or cube
depicting the typical profile or "shape" of strike activity in a
particular nation during a particular time period. Figure 1
(1) Notice that strike duration is calculated from the available
aggregate data by dividing total man-days lost by the total
number of strikers, which yields a "weighted" average duration
(as opposed to a simple arithmetical average computed from
Individual disputes) -- the weights being proportionate to the
number of workers involved in the strike. For example, If -wy, W2P
... wnare the number of workers involved in strikes 1, 2, e-on,
and if d1 , d2 ... d are the corresponding durations of' these
strikes in d3yvs), he number of man-days lost my m? ... mn =d1 wd2w 2, ... d w . The Total number of man-days' 1ot is M = mI
+M2+ ... +M , and the total number of workers involved is W= w1+W2
+ ... +wn* nihe weighted average duration defined in the text is
therefore
.uMamti2 .. mn = diw +d2w2+...+d wnDuration- M = wy 2 +'''n 1w 2 2' 'W w1 w 2+..+w w +W+...4v
where the weights are the number of workers involved in each
dispute. The practical significance of this is that the duration
measure is heavily Influenced by large-scale strikes.
11
displays two distinctive, hypothetical strike shapes.
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Although a great deal can be learned from the comparative,
historical analysis of strike profiles and individual strike
dimensions, (1) what is needed for the purposes of this study is
a single indicator of one overall magnitude of industrial
conflict. The most suitable index of of overall strike activity
is a quantity akin to the physical concept of volume, which of
course is simply the product of the three dimensions depicted in
Figure 1.
Strike Volume = Frequency X Duration X Size
man-days lost workers,
per 1000 strikes X _Man.-days X Involyed
nonagricultural nonagricultural workers strikes
civilian civilian involved
employees employees
in 1008s
Man-days lost from strikes per 1000 nonagricultural civilian
employees has both theoretical Justification (being the volume of
a three-dimensional profile that characterizes strike activity at
any time or place) and obvious intuitive appeal as a
comprehensive index of industrial conflict. Indeed, most
specialists have proposed man-days lost adjusted for labor force
size as the best single indicator of gross strike activity on a
2rlagrJ grounds. Since it is built up from a nation's overall
() See, for example, Shorter and Tilly, 1971.
Figure 1: Hypothetical Strike Profiles
Duration
(a)
Frequency:
Duration:
Size:
# of strikes per 1000 wage and salary workers
Mandays lost per striker in strikes
# of strikers per strike
Strike Volume = Mandays lost per
1000 wage and salary
workers
= Frequency X Duration X Size
I
Size
Frequency
(b)
.e - -
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strike profile, it allows inferences aoout long-run trends In
strike activity that are not confounded by changes In a single
conflict dimension. (1)
Individual "sides" of the profIlIe or cube give important,
secondary Indices of aggregate strike activity. It might be
plausibly argued, for example, that strike duration tells us more
about the relative power of the contestants in labor struggles --
low duration signifying that either labor or management is
relatively weak ano therefore concedes quickly when put to the
test of a strike -- than it does about worker militancy or
labor's propensity to strike. Therefore, the product of
FreqJency and Size alone may be of particular interest. This
quantity yields the number of workers involved in strikes
(strikers) per 1000 nonagricultural civilian wage and salary
workers, which might be designated as the (nonagricultural)
strike R&ril.irAtiaD rate. Barring involvement in more than one
strike by the same worker in a given year, the strike
participation variable gives the fraction of the labor force on
strike at some time during the year.
Figure 2 reports time-series plots of strike volumes (man-days
lost in strike activity oer JO0, nonagriculturical civilian
(1) Notice, for example, the reduction in strike duration but not
in strike volume between Figures 1(a) and 1(b). By using the
composite measure strike volume, one avoids making spurious
conclusions about trends in the gross magnitude of Industrial
conflict that can arise by focusing exclusively on one strike
dimension and mistaking changes in it for changes in overall
strike activity.
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employees) and strike participation rates (workers involved in
strikes per 1000 nonagricultural civilian employees) during the
twentieth century in 12 countriest Belgium, Canada, Denmark,
Finland, France, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden,
United Kingdom and the United States. (1) The sample of nations
inclides al I major Industrial societies except Germany. (2) The
exact time range of the strike series vary by country according
to the availability of the data; in some nations data on all
components of strike activity were not collected systematically
until the second quarter of the century; countries occupied by
the Germans during the second World War have gaos for the late
1930s and early 1940s; and for Japan and Italy there are long
gaps corresponding to the period of Fascist repression of
organized labor.
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE
It is clear from the plots that in most countries strike activity
exhioits great year-to-year fluctuation. Strike action normally
fell sharply during major business contractions, and increased
during Periods of economic recovery. (Major depressions are
(1) Small differences In definitions and methods of collection of
the strike data affect somewhat the accuracy of Intertemporal and
international comparisons. However, they are not important
enough to impair analyses of major changes through time and major
differences across countries in aggregate strike activity. See
the discussions in Fisher, 1973; Eldridge, 1968; and Ross and
Hartman, 196C, appendix.
(2) Germany was excluded from the sample of industrial societies
from the outset of this project because the partitioning of the
country makes long-run time-series analyses Problematic.
Figure 2: Strike Volume and
Twentieth Century
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identified on the plots in Figure 2.) (1) Although there are
some exceptIons to the pattern, widesoread unemployment typically
demoralized workers and their leaders, and led to great declines
in union membership. The strikes that were called during
depressions were usually desperate actions by unions in response
to wage cuts and as often as not were orovoked by management to
weaken labor organizations. Industrial conflict also declined
markedly in combatant rations during the first and second World
Wars. (cf. Figure 2.) In part this was due to legal
prohloitions against war-time strikes, but more important was the
voluntary commitment of unions in virtually all combatant (and
some neutral) countries to give maximum support to the war
effort. (Such pledges usually were accompanied by government
protection against attacks by capital on established labor
organizations.) War-time strikes in most countries were
sporadic, usually unauthorized by trade-union leaders, and very
short-lived. Most nations experienced strike explosions toward
the end or just after the end of the world wars as labor sought
to defend its war-time organizational gains, resolve the
shop-floor grievances accumulated over the long Period of
*discipline*, and preserve real wages in the face of
war-generated uoward movements in prices.
(I) Depressionsare iefined as periods In which unemoloyment
increased and Gross National Product and industrial production
decreased for two years in succession. The primary source used
to iJentify depression periods was Mitchell, 1975.
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A detailed analysis of these short-run movements in industrial
conflict will be presented in another paper; here attention is
focused on gross, long-run trends. Table I reports regression
estimates of the average percentage change per year in strike
volume and strike participation in each of the twelve countries.
A variety of schemes for estimating the long-run strike trends
were explored (including the conventional least-sauares linear
trend model and the 3ox-Jenkins ARMA trend model), but the most
satisfactory proved to be the simple log trend (exponential)
moae I.
Yt Y0 (1+g)t
log Yt = log Y0 + t log (1+g)
where Y denotes the strike variable and where g denotes the average
annual percentage rate of change (reported in Table 1).
The trend estimates in Table i merely summarize what Is apparent
from visual inspection of the time-series plots of strike volumes
and strike participation rates in Figure 2.
TABLE I ABOUT HERE
There simply is no evidence of a general decline or withering
away of strike activity In industrial societies during the
twentieth century. In six of the twelve countries -- Canada,
Finland, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States -- strike
activity has either increased or fluctuated (often markedly)
about a constant mean or equilibrium level. Industrial conflict
has declined significantly in Belgium and the Unitea Kingdom, but
has decreased to truly negligible levels only in Denmark, The
Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. Hence, the withering away of the
Table 1: Twentieth Century Trends in Strike Volume and
Strike Participation in Twelve Countries
(all nonagricultural sectors of economic activity)
Average Percentage Change Per Year
Strike Volume
(man-days lost per
1000 nonagricultural
civilian employees)
-3.50
negligible
-4.88
negligible
Strike Participation
(strikers per 1000
nonagricultural
civilian employees)
-2.74
+1.35
negligible
negligible
France
(Vol.:1900-35,
1946-72; Part.:
1900-38, 1946-72)
Italya
(Vol: 1916-23,
1949-72
Part: 1900-35,
1945-72
Japan
(Vol.: 1927-37,
1947-72
Part: 1914-38,
1947-72)
Netherlands
(1913-40
1946-72)
Norway
(1903-39,
1945-72)
Sweden
(1903-72)
United Kingdom
(1911-72)
United States
(Vol: 1927-72
Part: 1919-72)
negligible
+6.87
negligible
(curvilinear)
-10.15
-6.88
-9.65
-2.66
+4.46
+5.31
+7.81
-4.56
-5.00
-6.99
negligible
negligible negligible
aincludes agricultural workers
Belgium
(1927-40
1945-72)
Canada
(1901-72)
Denmark
(1900-72)
Finland
(1907-41,
1945-72)
16
strike is a rather limited phenomenon confined largely to the
smaller democracies of Northern Europe. Moreover, to the extent
that strike data are relevant in making judgements about the
state of class relations, the long-run trend results cast
considerable doubt on macrosociological arguments about the
integration of the working class into the social structure of
advanced capitalist nations.
At the same time, however, historical trends in strike activity
lead one to question the usefulness of the "new" labor militancy
orientation currently popular in many social science treatments
of contemporary industrial relations. Most strike outbursts of
the late i960s and early 1970s simply do not represent
significant departures from long- standing patterns in industrial
conflict. The events of May-June 1968 in France must of course
stand as an exception to this generaiLzation. The 1968 strike
wave was unquestionably the most severe in recorded French labor
history (1) (the strike volume of that year is nearly three times
larger than that of the great general strike of 1920) and it
surely merits the hundreds of studies devoted to it. (2) It
should be recognized, however, that France has a long history of
periodic strike explosions -- for example, 1906, 19±9-20, 1936,
(1) Actually, the strike wave of 1968 in France was not recorded
in the usual way at all; the man-days lost figure shown in the
French volume plot was derived from the careful unofficial
calculations of C. Ourand.
(2) An excellent source for references on the events of May-June
1968 Is Wylie, et al., 1973.
and 1947-48 -- of which 1968 Is the most dramatic example. (J)
Recent upturns in strike activity in other nations are just not
exceptional when viewed from the perspective of the long-run
record of labor relations. In Italy, the "hot autumn" of 1969
represents the peak of that nations postwar industrial conflict,
but Italian strike activity has fluctuated about a distinct
upwar'd trend since the early 1950s. The volume of strikes (but
not the strike participation rate) increased steadily over the
1966-72 period in the United Kingdom, but as I will show in
another paper this departure from the modest level of postwar
British industrial conflict is adequately explained by a fixed
coefficients econometric model that accounts for most of the
variation in strike activity since the 1930s. (2) The 1966-72
upward trend, therefore, does not require a special appeal to the
idea of a new labor militancy. It is obvi.ous from the
time-series plots for the remaining countries that recent
movements in strike volume and strike participation are quite
consistent with past patterns in strike activity, and thus do not
(1) See Shorter and Tlly, 1974, Chapter 5.
(2) My model for short-run fluctuations (see Hibbs, 1976) In
British strike activity suggests that two factors were
responsible for the 1966-72 trend: (1) the rate of growth of
real wages systematically lagged behind the rate of growth of
labor productivity in the industrial sector; and (11) the
reaction of the British trade union establishment to the
conservative government's Industrial Relations Act of 197±
(repealed by the subseauent labour government), which stimulated
the normally moderate Trades Union Congress (the peak union
organization) to join the shop stewards in pressing the militant
position. The latter factor of course only influenced the post
1970 strike rate.
require a search for unusual factors or the development of
special explanations.
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EXalanallana 9.1 Patierns In laaiclal f..w~n1cl
The log trend analyses discussed in the previous section, and
reporfted in Table I, do not yield a very satisfactory
characterization of long-run trends in industrial conflict.
Although the trend coefficients are significant by conventional
satistical criteria, the log trend equations "exolain" very
little of the variation in strike volume and strike
participation. (R 2s are not reported in Table 1, but they ranged
in the neighborhood of .20.) The reasons are aooarent from the
time-series plots. First, strike activity fluctuates greatly
about estimated trends or, in the trendless cases, about
equilibrium (mean) levels. Second, and for the purposes of this
study more Important, in nations where industrial conflict has
decreased substantially, the decline occured discontinuously in
the late 1930s -- or just after the second World War -- rather
than gradually by so many percent per year as the trend
coefficients imply. For example, in Sweden, strike volume does
not drop-off more or less continuously by nine or ten percent per
annum from the early 190js as the trend estimate in Table J
suggests, on the contrary, the withering away of the strike in
Sweden is apparent only by the late 1930s, and is particularly
marked during the postwar era. (1) Long-run changes In aggregate
levels of industrial conflict are therefore probably better
(1.) Figure 2 shows that the dramatic decline In strike activity
in Sweden, as in other countries, took place when the social
democrats assumed political power. I return to this important
point in the next section.
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summarized by contrasting pre- and post- World War II means.
Figure 3 shows a histogram of Interwar (1918-38) and postwar
(1944-72) average strike volumes (man-days lost per 1000
nonagricultural, civilian employees) for- the twelve countries.
The strike level means are given by the heights of the bars on
the vertical scale. For example, Norwdy's interwar mean strike
Volume was over 2,000, whereas its postwar mean was only about
100. Japan's interwar mean Volume was about 50; It's postwar
mean was nearly 30C. The mean strike Volumes of other countries
are -ead-off the tistogram in the same manner.
FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE
The histogram merely provides a graphic illustration of patterns
identified in the previous discussion of the time-series data.
In the period between the world wars, Norway, Sweden, the United
Kingdom, Denmark, and the Netherlands had the highest levels of
Industrial conflict in the western world. By the end of the
second world war, however, strike activity had declined
dramatically in these nations -- In most cases to negligible
levels. This contrasts sharply with the record for most of the
other countries. Elsewhere industrial conflict has either
oscillated about the same average level for approximately
three-quarters of a certury, or has actually increased somewhat
during the postwar era.
What explains these patterns in the evolution of aggregate strike
activity during the twentieth century? The sociological and
Average Strike Volumes, Interwar and Postwar Periodsa
Mean Strike Volume
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industrial relations literature suggests many reasons why we
should observe dgclining levels of industrial conflict, but
ItAkIL or JaQCfaljj magnitudes of strike activity are largely
unexplained. One school of thinking proposes that the roots of
labor conflict lie _n the disruptive changes brought on by the
process of Industrialization. Industrial conflict is viewed as
one expression of the class antagonisms associated with the
formation of large, discrete social groupings during the early
phase of industrial development. Once society passes through the
Period of basic industrialization into the "postindustrial" Phase
of complex and differentiated status and occuoetional
hierarchies, class conflict is replaced by class collaboration
and social Integration. Wilbert Moore, for example, has written:
The broad chaiges in the occupational structure in the process of
industrialization suggest that industrial conflict, in its
traditional sence, primarily fits a particular *stage* In
inoustrial development. That stage may be represented by the
shift from primary to secondary production, prior to the
elaborate specialization that tends to make the line between
management and labor blurred and shifting and prior to the
extensive development of tertlary production. (1)
Although Moore has called attention to important stages in the
evolution of industrial societies and his work presaged much of
the later "postindustrial" society literature, a "stages of
development" hypothesis does not account very well for the
long-run patterns in strike activity identified earlier.
Virtually every nation treated in this study passed through the
stage of basic industrialization long ago (Italy is perhaps an
(1) Moore, 1954, p. 230.
exception) and is rapidly developing all the attributes
associated with a postindustrial social structure; yet as the
previous analyses showed strike activity has declined
significantly in only a limited number of countries. Indeed, the
two countries with the most advanced tertiary sectors -- Sweden
and the United States -- stand at opposite poles with respect to
patterns of industrial conflict. Since the oeriod of basic
industrialization, Sweden's strike volume has decreased by
several orders of magnitude and is currently among the lowest in
the world. By comparison, in the United States, where tertiary
production and occupational specIaiIzation is probably more
advanced than in any other society, the postwar average strike
volume exceeds the prewar average and is among the l'ighest in the
capitalist world.
Other arguments have pointed to the persistence of full
employment, the enormous improvement in standards of living and
the &gIXourgaiggagal of the working class as important factors in
reducing class antagonisms and strikes. (1) The research of
Goldthorpe and his colleagues, among others, suggests that the
ALYIdCQaiwan thesis is greatly exaggerated, if not altogether
without substance. (2) More important, it is clear from
time-series strike data presented earlier that there is no
simple, mechanical connection between the long-run evolution of
industrial conflict ano changes in working class affluence or
(J) These arguments are summarized in Ross and Hartman, 1960.
(2) Goldthorpe et al. 1968.
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life styles. Living standards have changed for the better
virtually everywhere -- security of employment is greater, real
Incomes have increased, hours of work have decreased, and working
conditions have improved -- but strike activity has withered away
in only a few countries. Cross-nationally, we observe
comparatively high levels of industrial conflict in both
low-to-modest wage countries (e.g. Italy) and high wage countries
(e.g. the United States). Conversely, relatively low strike
rates are found among nations with very high wages and standards
of living (e.g. Sweden) as well as among nations with
moderate-to-low wages and living standards (e.g. the United
Kingdom). (1) Nor is there any evidence that strike activity is
any higher among lower paid workers than among workers in sectors
of economic activity with relatively favorable work conditions;
indeed, just the reverse has typically been the case. (2)
Ross ana Hartman have identified changes in the state's role in
industrial relations as one of the most critical influences on
trends in industrial conflict. In their chapter on the
"Withering Away of the Strike", they contend that an important
reason "for the general decline in labo--management conflict is
the heightened activity on the part of the state as operator of
(1) This Is not to say that there Is no relationship between
movements In real wages and short-run strike fluctuations, only
that long-run changes and International differences in labor
militancy bear no systematic association to income and related
variables.
(2) The data on this point will be presented in another paper on
intersectoral comparisons. See the seminal study by Kerr and
Siegel, J954.
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public enterprise, economic planner, protector of labor and
supervisor of industrial disputes". (1) I will argue below that
developments in the political system do indeed provide the
principal explanation for long-run trends in Industrial conflict,
however, the specific factors noted by Ross and Hartman seem to
me to be somewhat wide of the mark. Concerning government
ownership of the means of production, there simply is no evidence
that labor is any less militant or more conciliatory toward
public management ("state capitalists") than toward private
sector management. It is of course true that in North America
public ownership is negligible and both Canadian and American
strike rates stand at comparatively high levels, and historically
have not exhibited a downward trend. Contrary to widespread
conceptions, however, government ownership is also of little
consequence in Sweden where strike activity has been
insignificant during the postwar period. By contrast, state
ownership of productive enterprises is more extensive in France
and Italy than in virtually all other non-Communist countries;
yet strike activity shows no signs of declining in either nation
(indeed, in Italy it has increased steadily during most of the
postwar period).
Government Intervention in particular strikes, as well as more
general attempts by the state to suppress collective labor action
or to legitimate the status of trade unions, has obviously had
great influence on unions* ability to mobilize workers and pursue
(Q) Ross and Hartman, 1960, p. 50.
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aggressively disputes with management.
evidence that state involvement as
supervisor" of economic activity and I
contributed significantly to a general
However,
planner,
ndustrial
decline
there is little
protector, and
relations has
in industrial
conf I ict. State intervention in the economy has politicized
strike, in the sense that militant union action can oose a
serious challenge to government coordinated "Incomes policies',
and to more modest government efforts to check the rate of
inflation. (1) In systems where the state participates directly
in setting wages (or wage floors) and conditions of work (e.g.
France, Italy, and in recent years the United Kingdom), the
strike is often used as a form of political pressure on the
government either to grant concessions to labor unilaterally or
to coerce a favorable settlement from recalcitrant employers. (2)
In general, then, state involvement in industrial relations has
cont-ibuted to the olaitiZaijLjan of strike activity -- but not
to its decline as an Instrument of collective working class
action.
(i) This point is pursued more fully In my forthcoming paper
"Labor Militancy and Wage Inflation: A Comparative Analysis."
(2) Notwithstanding the larger political visiors of many
left-wing union leaders, most workers are probably mobilized for
strike activity not by slogans about worker seizure of political
power but by the narrower economic Incentives usually associated
with American "business unionism." As Lorwin put it in his study
of French labor relations "When they received wage ad)ustments,
workers, including most union members, showed little
dete-mination to press for the institutional content of
agreements about which their leaders talked."* (1966, P. 215) Even
the massive strikes of May-June 1968 in France (which were viewed
largely as spontaneous "political" events in many popular
accounts) centered in the overwhelming majority of cases around
traditional demanas for wage increases and came to an end in the
wake of sizeable wage concessions from the government and
employers. See Ourand, 1973 and Ross, 1973.
the
Ith E2iL1&ai 5.xilm and lba Locus al1 =trlCluilnal Con f 10t
The principal theoretical weakness of the literature reviewed
earlier, and the main reason it does not yield a satisfactory
explanation of secular trends and international differences in
industrial conflict, is that It falls to identify the function
and purposes of strike activity in capitalist, industrial
societies. Strikes are viewed largely as reactive ohenomena
rather than purposive, collective actions and, consequently,
analysis focuses on determining mechanical connections between
industrial conflict and exogenous changes in the occupational
structure, working class affluence aid life-styles, narrowly
conceived institutional arrangements, aid the like. Moreover, as
Korpi has recently pointed out, (1) such of the traditional
liter!ature adopts Dahrendorfos view of the inherent tendency
towa-d institutional separation of industrial and political
conflict in advanced capitalist nations. As a result, what I
believe are critical linkages between conflict in the industrial
and oolitical arenas tend to be obscured.
The argument developed here is that at the macro-theoretical
level strikes should be viewed as Instruments of collective
working class action and that Uaiag a.tig.ity i s one
MadLLIIAtilaQ i 41D angoing struggleA Igt pgj ewen 5.Qscia.
!aiaaaEas g " th14a dUir ib utIon 21 C-uauQCCAs, Drincloally
(1) Korpi, 1975.
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1ihaggaqgigQ1_axig.glyL niatLion al 1n02a=- (J) The main ttesis of
the study is that 1i2naCr.I =AaStg la L£a gLume 21 ilndstlal
ganlili ACr iaCsriY. MD Lai"12 iaa D tb 1 i.z 21 lba
d1itibutionail lcaagl. Strike activity has declined
dramatically in nations where Social Democratic or Labor parties
assumed power in the 1930s -- or just after the second World War
and created the modern "welfare state". In these countries an
enormous fraction of the national income now Passes through the
public sector and is allocated by the pg.illJsal
Political conflict between left-and right-wing
electoral arena (i.e., the political marketplac
industrial conflict between labor and capital
sector (i.e., the economic marketplace) as the u
for the distribution of national income. By
countries governed more or less continuously by
of thie center and right, the private sector cont
the 2112.jj120 as well as the RC2dME112a of
economic marketplace remains the primary locus o
parties in the
e) has replaced
in the private
Itimate mechanism
comparison, in
bourgeols parties
inues to dominate
resources. The
f distributional
conflict in these nations,
of strike activity has
three-quarters of a century or
and, consequently,
been
more.
the
relatively
average
constant
The evidence in favor of
in the overall volume
this
of
interpretation of long-run
industrial conflict is,
changes
I think
() cf. Shorter and Tilly J974, especially Chapters I and 13,
Snyder and Tilly, 1972, and especially Korpli, 1975. Although I
read Korpi*s unpublished paper after this section was drafted,
the theory sketched here is in broad agreement with his analysis
of the evolution of Swedish industrial relations.
level
for
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compelling. It is clear from the data Presented in Figures 2 and
3 that nations experiencing a sustained decline or withering away
of strike activity during the postwar era are largely those where
working class-based, union supported Social Democratic and Labor
parties assumed power (having successfully mobilized mass
political support in the electoral arena) and engineered the
welfare state. This historical development In the political
economy of some capitalist, Industrial societies represented a
massive shift of political power away fiom business interests and
their middle class allies to what Samuel Beer has called the
"organized working class." Some Idea of the close association
between the evolution of strike activity and the shift of
oolitical power between the social classes is given by Figure 4,
which shows a scatterplot of the interwar-to-postwar change in
average strike volume and the Interwar-to-postwar change in the
average percentage of cabinet (executive) posts held by
Socialist, Labor, and Communist parties. (The years In which
Socialist/Labor parties were continuously in power or alternated
regularly in power with bourgeois parties are identified on the
strike volume and participation plots Ii Figure 2.)
FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE
The variables in Figure 4 clearly exhibit a strong linear
association (the correlation is -.97); at one extreme of the
figure lie the countries where center and rightist governments
have ruled almost continuously throughout the twentieth century
(Japan, Canada, U.S., etc.); at the other extreme Ile the nations
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Figure 4: Change in Average Strike Volume and Average Socialist-Labor and
Communist Percentage Cabinet Representation, Interwar to Postwar
Perioda
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where Social Democratic and Labor parties have dominated postwar
governments (Norway and Sweden). (1) Countries in which leftist
parties have shared or alternated in power with bourgeois parties
during the postwar period fall in an intermediate position with
respect to the decline in strike volume.
What is crucial for explaining long-run trends In strike
activity, however, is not the assumption of political power by
Social Democratic parties agt "i but rather the change in the
locus of the distribution of the national Income produced by the
welfa-e state policies of Social Democratic regimes. By
socializing the consumption and distribution (though not
necessarily the production) of an enormous fraction of the Gross
National Product, Social Democratic and Labor Governments
engineered a massive circumvention of the economic marketplace.
The principal locus of distribution of the national product was
shifted from the private sector (where property and capital
interests enjoy an Inherent advantage with respect to
distributional outcomes) to the public sector (where the
political resources of the organized working class are more
telling.)
(i) A discussion of the reasons underlying international
differences in the electoral success and executive political
power of Socialist, Labor, and Communist parties is beyond the
scope of this paper. It should be noted, however, that the
"politicization" of the strike is most pronounced in France and
Italy, where, as I pointed out earlier, the state is heavily
involved in establishirg wages and conditions of work in the
private sector, and, also, where Leftist parties have commanded a
sizeable share of the vote for thirty years or more but have been
largely frozen out of positions of executive power.
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Although the public sector share of the GNP has increased in
virtually all countries during the postwar period, and early
welfare state measures were in some cases introduced by the right
to retard development of labor movement parties (e.g. the social
Insurance legislation initiated by Bismark and Lloyd George), the
most dramatic increases in public sector expenditure were
primarily the result of Social Democratic and Labor Government
policies. (.) Consider the historical experience of the two
cases that Ile near the opposite ends of the range of variation
in the political power of the working class and the extent of
public sector allocation of the national income -- Sweden and the
United States. Between 938 and 1972, the fraction of the GNP
passing through the public sector (exclusive of expenditures for
defense and nationalized industries) in Sweden, which has been
governed almost continuously by the Social Democrats since the
early 1930s, grew from less than 1/5 to almost 1/2; i.e. nearly
trioled. In contrast, from 1938 to 1972 nondefense general
government expenditure increased from just under 1/5 of the GNP
to only about 1/4 of the GNP in the United States, which of
course has never experienced socialist or labor party rule. The
(1) In the United Kingdom, for example, the public sector share
of the GNP (exclusive of defence) expanded in three waves:
iD 1944-48, from less than 20% to 35% as a result of the
first postwar Labour government's creation of the welfare
state and nationalization;
2) 1964-68, from 35% to 45%, du-ing the second postwar
Labour government; and (although it is beyond the time frame
of this study)
3) 1973-75, from 45% to 55%, as the third Labour government
tried to deliver on its side of the social contract.
See the analysis in the Economi.t, February 21, 1976.
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experience of other nations falls at vaIous points within the
bounds set by these polar cases. Some empirical support for the
historical model sketched here for long-run gtgAVg in the volume
of st-Ike activity is given in Figure 5, which displays simple
correlations between the growth of Social Democratic and Labor
political power (percentage cabinet repoesentatIon), the change
in the locus of the distribution of national income (growth of
the oublic sector share of the GNP) , and change In strike volume
(man-days lost ner 100C nonagricultural civilian employees) from
the interwar to postwar oeriod in ten countries. (1)
Change in +.023 Change in Public -. 812 Change in
Socialist/Labor Sector Allocatlian -Strike Volume
Political Power (change in nondefense (Interwar-to-oostwar
(Interwar-to- general government change in average
postwar change expenditure as a % man-days lost
in average % of GNP, 1938-1972) per 1OG employees)
of cabinet
posts held)
-. 965
(1) I was unable to find data on pre-World War II general
government expendituire in Belgium aid Italy and so the
correlations in Figure 5 are based on ten rather than twelve
countries. Sources of the government expenditure data weret
circa 1938: Statistical Office of the United Nations, 1950 and
Oshima, 1957;
£972: O.E.C.D., 1974.
Sources of the data for the other variaoles are given in earlier
notes.
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Postwar jgy~gjg of strike activity are also welI explained by this
highl abstracted model of the causal relations between working
class political power, the importance of the public sector for
the allocation of national Income, and the volume of strike
activity. Figure 6 reports the simple correlations among the
relevant Indicators, but here the 1972 average tax rate for a
typical manufacturing production worker with two children is used
to measure the importance of the public sector for distributional
outcomes. (i)
Postwar +.775 Average Tax -.746 Average Postwar
Socialist/Labor Rate t- Strike Volume
Political Power (average for (man-days lost
(average X of married manuf. per 1oao
cabinet posts, production workers nonagricultural
1944-72) with two children, employees, 1944-72,
1972) log scale)
Clearly, postwar levels as well as interwar-to-nostwar changes in
aggregate strike activity vary inversely with the extent to which
national income is raised and distributed via the political
process. In nations such as Denmark, Norway, the Netherlands,
(1.) ihe average tax rate for manufacturing production workers is
a good index of the relevance of the public sector for the
blue-collar class. Analyses undertaken with alternative
measures, e.g. the marginal tax rate and the precentage of the
national income passing through the public sector, produced
results very similar to those reported in Figure 6. The source
of the tax rate data was O.E.C.D., 1975, Appendix, Table 6.
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and Sweden, where the public sector share of the GNP is nearly
50%, the average tax rate for blue-collar workers is in the
30-35% range, and the marginal tax rate approaches 60%, the
political arena is the key focus of distributional outcomes and,
therefore, Industrial conflict stands at comparatively low
levels. By contrast, In countries with relatively high strike
volumes (for example, Canada, Italy, and the United States), the
fraction of the GNP passing through the public sector is on the
order of 25 to 30%, the average tax rate for manufacturing
workers is 15% or less, and the marg1n3l tax rate is in the
23-28% range. The bulk of the national income is allocated in
the private sector in these societies and, therefore, the
economic marketolace remains the most important arena of conflict
over distributional outcomes.
The basic argument of this section Is summarized from a slightly
different perspective in Table 2, which shows how the loci of
dist-ibutional conflict and the character of strike activity vary
by tne degree of state economic Intervention and the market
orientation of state politico-economic goals. In nations with
comparatively low (passive) state litervention and market
supporting (bourgeois) state goals, the private sector is the
primary arena of conflict over distributional outcomes, "business
unionism" is the dominant oriertation of organized labor, and
strike activity is relatively high and has shown no tendency to
decline over the long-run. Canada and the United States are
examoles of this pattern. Strike activity also stands at
State Intervention
Table 2
Active (High) Passive (Low)
Market
Supporting
(Bourgeois)
State
Political/
Economic
Goals
(Ideology)
Market
Modifying
(Social
Democratic)
primary locus of distributional conflict:
private sector with state intervention
implications for strike activity:
"politicization" of the strike, little or
no decline in strike volume
exemplars: France, Italy
long-run strike trend: negligible or upward
postwar average strike volume: 670
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972: 3 3 .0%a
average tax rate, 1972: 11%b
primary locus of distributional conflict:
public sector/political process
implications for strike activity:
'withering away' of the strike;
displacement of distributive conflict
to political marketplace
exemplars: Denmark, Norway, Sweden
long-run strike trend: downward from
late 1930s
postwar average strike volume: 103
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972: 4 4 .8%a
average tax rate, 1972: 31.3%b
primary locus of distributional conflict:
private sector
Implications for strike activity:
"business unionism", little or no decline
in strike volume
exemplars: Canada, U.S.
long-run strike trend: negligible or upward
postwar average strike volume: 557
gov't revenue as % of GNP, 1972: 2 8 .7%a
average tax rate, 1972: 1 5%b
Null Cell
aexcluding defense and state productive enterprises
b
mean for manufacturing production workers with two children
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comparatively high levels and exhibits no signs of decining In
countries where the state has intervened actively in the labor
market on behalf of market supporting goals; i.e. has actively
participated in private sector bargaining over wages, hours and
conditions of work without socializing the consumption and
distribution of a very large fraction of the national income.
The distinctive feature of industrial relations in societies
falling in this category is the lltiLzatian of the strike.
The state is an important actor in the industrial relations
system and, therefore, the strike is frequently used as a form of
political action to exert pressure on the government. France and
Italy are the exemplary cases. Only in societies where the state
has actively (and successfully) pursued market modifying policies
has there been a massive displacement of conflict over
distributional issues to the electoral arena and, as a result,
the "withering away" of the strike in the economic marketplace.
This historical configuration Is of course best illustrated by
the Scandinavian Social Oemocracies. (1)
(1) -Heaoey has argued that a similar configuration of factors
underlies trade union acceptance of Incomes policies. See
Headey, 1970.
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FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE
The traditional two-bloc Danish party system experienced a severe
shock in the 1973 election when two new "orotest" parties burst
upon the Political scene. (1) The election was triggered when
Erhard Jacobsen, a well-known Social Oemocrat, defected from his
party over the issue of increasing taxes on single-family houses
and organized the new Center Democrat party. The most striking
(1) DO the 1973 Danish election, see Barre, 1974 and Einhorn,
J975.
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60% L
%Vote
50%
40%
30%
* ='Old' Bourgois Bloc (Conservatives, Agrarian
Liberals, Radical Liberals)
* =Socialist/Communist Bloc (Social Democrats,
Socialist Peoples Party, Left Social Communists)
* = 'new' Bourgois/Welfare Protest Bloc (Progressive
Party, Center Democrats, Independents)
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970
Sources: Borre, 1975 and Damgaard, 1974
20%
10%
0 %
1975
38
political development, however, was the appearance of the new
Progress party, formed by Mogens Glistrup, a tax lawyer fond of
comparing tax dodgers to the Oanish resistance fighters during
the Nazi occupation, who publically boasted of having paid no
taxes in 1972, despite a sizeable income and net worth. Glistruo
exploited the enormous publicity surrounding his tax case to
attack the Income tax, the bureaucracy, and the incompetence of
the established parties, thereby mobilizing support for his
Progress party. The GlIstrup movement presented a fundamental
oolitical assault on the Janish system of collective consumption
and distribution. Unlike Jakobsen's Center Democrats, which was
launchea In opposition to a particular tax policy (although
Jakobsen's party undoubtedly symbolized and exploited more
wide-ranging discontent with the welfare state), or the
Indeoendent Party, wnich had stood in oppositior to the growth of
the welfare state since the early 1950s, Glistrup*s Progress
party advocated a drastic roll-back in state bureaucracy,
government expenditure, and social services to achieve a drastic
reduction in taxes, particularly Income taxes.
The anti-welfare state "protest" parties (the "new bourgeols"
bloc) received a combined total of 23.7 percent of the vote in
the December, 1973 election; the vote share of the established
bourgeois and socialist olocs felt from 96.1 percent to a postwar
low of b9.3 percent. (cf. Figure 7) Glistrups party alone
commanded 15.9 percent of the vote and 28 of the 175
parliamentary seats, making the Progress party the second largest
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(behind the Social Democrats) in the Dalish tjhJ8jjjD. Although
that of traditional political blocs recovered significartly in
the subsequent election of January 1975 -- increasing from 69.3
to 77.1 percent -- and the vote share of the "new bourgeois,"
orotest parties dropoeo off -- declining from 23.7 to 15.8
oercent -- Glistrup's Progressives showed amazing staying-power
for a perty without long-standing electoral roots -- receiving
13.6 percent of the oopular vote and 24 parliamentary seats.
It is difficult to say why this massive outburst against the
Danish welfare state came In 1973 (1) -- after all the
Inaeoendents had provided a political outlet for the expression
of such discontent for more than twenty years. Perhaps it was
because a critical threshold had been reached in the level of
opublic -xpenditure nsrd the burden of taxation. The fact that
Denmark was particularly hard hit by the world economic recession
m ay have also played a role. What is clear from the extensive
survey analysis of Rusk and Borre, however, is that the issue
base of the two new protest parties -- Glistrup's Progressives
and Jakobsen's Center Democrats -- was dissatisfaction with the
(1) Aoparently, the latent tensions underlying the 1973 election
outcome went undetected by Scandinavian social scientists. As
late as 1969, for example, the Danish election specialist Mogens
Pede-sen wrote that Denmark was "...one of the most dull
countries to deal with for an empirically oriented student of
votlig behavior. Apparently the Danish Political system lacks
most of the characteristics that form the point of departure for
many modern researcth workers, i.e. conflicts, cleavages, and
instabilities. Homogerelty characterizes the Danish electorate.
No religious, ethnic, ragional or other types of significant
subcultures exist, which might threaten the maintenance of the
political system or at least produce conflicts and tensions among
the voters." Pedersen, 1969, p. 253.
performance and increasing financial burdens of the welfare state
combined with a lack of confidence that the established parties
were likely to provide relief. (1) It was of course entirely
rational for voters disenchanted with the welfare state to look
outside the established party system to the new bourgeoi.s parties
for effective opposition to the continued growth of the public
sector. The welfare state was the creature of the Social
Democrats, and governments of the "old bourgeois" parties had
shown little inclination to alter the system appreciably.
Indeed, taxes rose sharply during the 1968-71 period of bourgeois
rule. Whether the "new bourgeois," anti-welfare state political
bloc, built around Gistrup*s Progress party, persists in the
long-run undoubtedly depends on whether the traditional Danish
bourgeois parties are able (or willing) to establish credibility
with those opposed to continued public sector domination of the
distribution of resources. (2)
(i) Rusk and Borre, 1974.
(2) Prime Minister Poul Hartling's Agrarian-Liberal minority
government made overtures in this direction in September J974
when a 7 billion jC2DgC cut in income taxes and government
expenditure was passed in parliament with the support of Radical
Libe-als, Conservatives, Center Democrats, Christian People's
Party, Single Taxers, and some members of the Progress Party. I
am tempted to infer, without support from survey evidence, that
the decline in "new bourgeois" electoral support in the 1975
election was associatec with this significant policy change. In
any case, public sentiment continues to run strong against
further extensions of the Danish welfare state: The hIt. lat
LLiMn. (September 28, 1975) reports polls taken in 1975 Indicating
that 63 percent of the Public felt that the burden of taxation
was excessive and that the welfare state had gone too far. The
minority Social Democratic government, which assumed office after
the 1975 election, responded to the drift in public sentiment by
submitting a budget that further reduced welfare spending.
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Although the EEC controversy produced the most severe disturbance
to the established Norwegian party system, a "new bourgeois"
flash political party, akin to the GlIstrup movement in Denmark,
also appeared in Norway in 1973. The new anti-welfare state
party was organized by Anders Lange -- a former activist in the
old rightist movements of the 1930s -- around a platform calling
for radical reductiors in public expenditure and taxation.
"Anaes Lange's Party" (ALP) was at first greeted with derision
by the traditional parties of the left and right, but the new
protest movement was taken a great oeal more seriously when it
received 5 percent of the vote and 4 seats in the i1Q..lla in the
September 1973 election. However, the ALP vote share dropped to
less than 2 percent in the subsequent election in 1975. Why the
(1) See Valen and Rokkan, 1974.
(1)
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Anders Lange's Party showed less initial strength and less
staying-power than the Glistrup Progressives in Oenmark is not
altogether clear. Lange's death in J974 surely contributed to
the ALP's decline in 1975, since the party had virtually no
organizational base and was built around the personality of its
founder. More fundamental factors were probably also at work.
The political cleavage structure is more complex in Norway than
elsewhere in Scandin3via -- geography and culture are important
in addition to class -- and consequently left/right issues are
not as dominant in electoral behavior. (i) Also, the Norwegian
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Democ-rats form the socialist bloc; the Center party, the People's
party, ano the Conservatives comprise the bourgeois bloc. The
Social Democrats have governed continously since the early 1930s,
although there is no reason to expect the bourgeois oarties to be
permanently in opposition; the popular vote has been Quite evenly
split between the two blocs since the early 1950s. The most
significant postwar covelopment in the Swedish party system has
been the dramatic growth of the Center oarty, which during the
last dozen years has steadily absorbed former supporters of the
Libe-ats and now stands as the largest party of the bourgeois,
opposition bloc. (1)
The interesting question for our purposes Is why Sweden has not
experienced a "new bourgeols", anti-welfare state movement
similar to the Glistrup phenomenon in Denmark or the smaller
Anders Lange Party in Norway. I think the most plausible
explanation is that Sweden is the only highly developed welfare
state in which the traditional bourgeois parties have been In
opposition for the entire postwar era. (2) Responsibility for
growth of the bureaucracy, public exoenditure, and taxation,
therefore, rests wholly with the Social Democrats. Consequently,
the old bourgeois bloc stands as a viable alternatve to the
welfare state, and popular discontent with the system of
collective consumption and distribution has been channeled
(1) See Petersson, 1974; S~rlvik, 1975; and Sgrlvik in Rose, ed.
J974.
(2) See, for example, the analyses of Valen and Rokkan, J974 and
Petersson, 1974.
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through the established right-of-center parties.
Survey evidence reported by Sarlvik suggests that such discontent
is widespread, and has increased significantly in recent years.
The survey results reproduced in Table 3 show that the proportion
of the Swedish mass public advocating a reduction in social
welfare benefits grew from 41 percent to 60 percent between 1968
and 1973. The growth of opposition to welfare policies is
apparent among the supporters of all political parties, and is
particularly pronounced among Social Democratic voters.
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE
This *shift to the right* on the social welfare issue coincides
with a gradual (albeit small) erosion of socialist bloc electoral
strength which began in 1970, continued into the J973 election
and, if recent political preference surveys are any guide, (j)
may well lead to the first bourgeois government In 44 years
after the upcoming September 1976 election. (2)
(-j)According to poll results published in 12ftQ1 Nyheter, June
5, 1976, less than 40 percent of the public considered the Social
Democrats to be the "best" party in April and May, 1976 -- a
decline of more than j percent from the May J969 results.
(2) As readers undoubtedly are aware, the Social Democrats were
defeated in the election and a Center Party - led bourgeois
coalition is about to assume power. It was inevitable that the
Social Democrats would eventually lose an election; It is not
possible to say without survey data to what extent their defeat
at this time was due to the "welfare state' Issue. The expansion
of nuclear power, a trade-union-Social Democratic plan to
gradually 'expropriate' large firms, and the fact that the Social
Democrats simply have been in power for so long, were also issues
in the campaign.
Table 3: Views on Welfare State Policies in Sweden 1968-1973
(interview question: "Social reforms have gone so far in this
country that in the future the State should reduce rather than
increase social benefits and support for the citizens.")a
Party Vote
1968
Communist
% Agree
% Disagree
1973
% Agree
% Disagree
13%
77
Social
Democrat
28%
65
22% 47%
70 46
Center People's Moderate All Voters
Party Party and Nonvoters
56%
38
76%
18
54%
39
71%
23
68%
25
78%
15
41%
52
60%
32
akmbiguous or 'don't know' responses omitted.
Source: Sarlvik, 1975, Table 12.
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The appearance of "new bourcieols" flash political movements in
Denmark and Norway, and the erosion of social democratic
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